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ON HEARSAY 
Hon. Richard A. Posner* 
 
I need to place the remarks that follow in context.  And that means I need 
to acknowledge a number of heresies:  I don’t like legal jargon; I don’t like 
the complexity of legal jargon; I don’t like the legal profession’s 
indifference to brevity; I don’t like the tendency of lawyers and judges 
always to be looking to the past for answers to novel questions; and I don’t 
consider law to be a science or remotely like a science.  I want law to be 
simple and commonsensical and forward-looking.1  I take my judicial credo 
from a poem by the great Irish poet William Butler Yeats:  “And I grew 
weary of the sun / Until my thoughts cleared up again, / Remembering that 
the best I have done / Was done to make it plain.”2  Or, in the words of 
another though lesser known poet, Ezra Pound, “MAKE IT NEW!”3 
I want judges to be well-informed, curious, experienced, and empathetic.  
And speaking of experience, I contend that every appellate judge who does 
not have a rich background as a trial lawyer or trial judge should volunteer 
to handle civil and criminal, jury and bench, trials (including the pretrial 
phase of the litigation that has eventuated in a trial).  I was appointed as a 
federal court of appeals judge in 1981.  I was forty-two years old and had 
experience as a law clerk, an appellate practitioner, an academic, and an 
expert witness, but no experience as either a trial lawyer or a trial judge.  So 
from the start of my judicial career I handled, and I continue to handle, 
trials (both jury and bench, and civil and criminal, though very few of the 
latter) and pretrial proceedings in district courts (mainly the Northern 
District of Illinois) in my circuit (the Seventh Circuit).  And it is this 
experience that enables me to talk about hearsay evidence and the hearsay 
rule. 
But I need first to provide more in the way of context.  The hearsay rule 
and its numerous exceptions are inseparable from the adversary system of 
legal procedure, and that system as normally practiced strikes me as 
unsatisfactory.  It relies too heavily on cross-examination to separate truth 
from falsity, and cross-examination is not, as lawyers and trial judges like 
to think, the greatest engine ever invented for determining truth.  I think 
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 1. So naturally I abhor The Bluebook, that symbol of mindless nitpicking. 
 2. William Butler Yeats, Words, in THE GREEN HELMET AND OTHER POEMS 93 (1910) 
(emphasis added). 
 3. EZRA POUND, MAKE IT NEW (Faber & Faber Ltd. 1934). 
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judges leave too much of the development of facts to the lawyers—for 
example, by underutilizing judicial authority (a good example of an 
important exception to adversary procedure) to appoint neutral expert 
witnesses under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  I think it 
generally is a mistake to base jury instructions on the pattern instructions 
concocted by committees of lawyers and judges; the instructions are too 
legalistic for the understanding of the average juror.  I think judges allow 
pretrial discovery and the trials themselves to go on for too long.  I think 
they should do more at the pretrial phase to streamline the forthcoming trial, 
for example, by ruling on objections to exhibits in advance of the trial.  I 
think that jurors should be allowed to ask questions during a trial both 
orally and in writing, so that they feel they are fully active participants in 
the trial and not just bumps on a log pretending to understand the legal 
jargon of the lawyers and the judge and the give and take between the 
lawyers and the witnesses.  And I limit to one word objections to a 
witness’s testimony or to exhibits during trial, with a sidebar if necessary 
for explanation and ruling.  In this way I prevent lawyers from using 
objections as occasions for making speeches to the jurors. 
And, coming closer to my subject, I think the judiciary has allowed the 
rules of trial procedure and of evidence to balloon excessively—notably 
including the rules of evidence.  There are sixty-eight Federal Rules of 
Evidence, of which the seven involving hearsay occupy twenty-eight pages 
in West’s immense volume of Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules.4  
The volume devotes 117 pages to the rules of evidence, of which the 
hearsay rules (for the hearsay “rule” is actually a composite of separate 
rules relating to hearsay) have a big share:  twenty-eight pages is 24 percent 
of 117 pages.  To this must be added an academic literature on evidence 
that is staggering in its length, indecision, and obscurity.  And yet in my 
experience the hearsay rules play little role in the federal trial process.  
Hearsay objections are rare and usually can be circumvented.  The hearsay 
rule is a rule of exclusion, yet is riddled with exceptions. 
Most of the evidence rules could be discarded without loss, but not all.  A 
few of the rules are accurate and helpful, notably Rule 403 (balancing test 
permitting exclusion of relevant evidence if probative value is substantially 
outweighed by prejudicial or other adverse effects),5 which ideally would 
be all you need; Rule 407 (subsequent remedial measures ordinarily not 
being admissible to prove negligence, as otherwise post-accident remedial 
measures would be discouraged); Rules 412 to 415, which allow the 
introduction of evidence of prior crimes by sexual offenders, because such 
 
 4. See generally FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES (Thomson West 
2016). 
 5. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
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offenders tend to be obsessive;6 and the already mentioned Rule 706, 
authorizing court-appointed expert witnesses. 
Rules 801 to 807 are the hearsay rules, and to understand them one needs 
first to understand the legal meaning of hearsay.  Essentially it is a report by 
one person of what some other person said or wrote.  If I say that someone 
told me it’s going to rain this afternoon, my statement is hearsay (I am 
“saying” what I “heard” = “hearsay”).  Hearsay is presumptively 
inadmissible in a trial because the source of a hearsay statement (repeated 
by a witness at the trial) is a nonparty to the litigation.  He is the person 
from whom the witness heard the statement that the witness wishes to 
repeat in court, and ordinarily that nonparty source is unavailable to be 
cross-examined. 
Of course almost all the knowledge we have is hearsay.  It is knowledge 
that was imparted to us in school, on the job, in books, and increasingly in 
electronic media.  It is not the fruit of our own firsthand investigation.  
Some of it is reliable, much of it not, and because reliability is critical, it’s 
sometimes argued that there should be no hearsay rule—that the main 
criterion for the admissibility of evidence should be whether it is reliable, 
not whether it is first or secondhand.7  I say “main” and not “sole” because 
length, materiality, and intelligibility are other criteria of admissibility. 
I am not entirely unsympathetic to the suggestion.  I can imagine benefits 
from allowing Rule 807 (the “Residual Exception”) to swallow much of 
Rules 801 through 806 and thus many of the exclusions from evidence, 
exceptions to the exclusions, and notes of the Advisory Committee.  The 
hearsay rule, with its multitude of exceptions, is too complex.  Trials would 
go better with a simpler rule, the core of which would be the proposition 
(essentially a simplification of Rule 807) that hearsay evidence should be 
admissible when it is reliable, when the jury can understand its meaning, 
strengths, and limitations, and when it will materially enhance the 
likelihood of a correct outcome without taking up too much time at trial.  I 
am mindful too of studies that find that jurors tend to be skeptical of 
hearsay evidence,8 which if the studies are true imply that hearsay evidence 
admission does little harm even when it’s unreliable. 
But I am not yet ready to endorse the abolition of the hearsay rule.  The 
reason is that, as I said, most of our knowledge is hearsay.  To abolish the 
 
 6. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON 
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT:  SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 26–27 (1997) (determining that 
convicted sex offenders have a much higher likelihood of being rearrested for rape or sexual 
assault than any other type of offender); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) 
(finding “risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high’” and high 
recidivism rate leads to “dangerousness as a class” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 
(2002))). 
 7. Professor Richard D. Friedman comes close to advocating this approach in his 
important article, Jack Weinstein and the Missing Pieces of the Hearsay Puzzle, 64 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 449 (2015).  For outright advocacy of the abolition of the hearsay rule, see Ronald J. 
Allen, Commentary, A Response to Professor Friedman:  The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule 
to a Rule of Admission, 76 MINN. L. REV. 797 (1992). 
 8. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Case for eHearsay, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1327–31, 
1334–35 (2014); Justin Sevier, Popularizing Hearsay, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2016). 
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hearsay rule in favor of Rule 403, which in essence requires weighing the 
costs versus the benefits (that’s appropriate shorthand for weighing 
probative value against prejudicial effect, confusion potential, etc.) of 
hearsay evidence, might require the judge in a typical trial to make an 
enormous number of rulings on whether to admit or exclude such evidence.  
So without a hearsay rule—that is, without a limitation on the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence—trials would sprawl.  Not only would there be lots of 
attempts to introduce hearsay evidence in trials, but rulings on objections to 
such evidence would be difficult because often it’s very difficult to estimate 
the reliability of a hearsay statement.  The fact that jurors tend (it appears) 
to discount hearsay evidence would act as some check on lawyers’ 
eagerness to present such evidence, but not I think enough to avoid 
weighing down too many trials with too much hearsay evidence. 
So I think not only that we’re stuck with the hearsay rule as a practical 
matter, but also that we need the hearsay rule—albeit with exceptions, as 
the federal hearsay rules recognize—but not, I’ll argue, all the exceptions.  
So let me turn now to the rules (subrules, one might call them) that 
constitute the federal hearsay rule.  I will touch on just the main rules and 
will leave out many of the details of them.  The first, Rule 801 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as a statement that “a party 
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement.”9  But two exceptions are listed:  first, where the defendant 
testified and is subject to cross-examination about a statement that he made 
out of court;10 and second, where the out-of-court statement was made by 
the opposing party in the litigation.11 
The limitation of hearsay to statements is important, for there are 
communications that don’t take the form of a statement.  The common 
example is unfurling an umbrella.  That action communicates the fact that 
it’s raining, but because there is no statement, the communication is not 
subject to the hearsay rule.12 
Rule 803, the next rule I’ll discuss, is a list of twenty-three exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.  Two of these—“present sense impression” and “excited 
utterance”—I’ll discuss later, together with an exception found in Rule 804, 
“dying declaration.”  Other exceptions in Rule 803 include various types of 
records (including a record of something that the witness doesn’t recall), 
records kept in the regular course of business, public records, records of 
baptism and similar ceremonies, some types of reputation evidence, and 
legal judgments. 
Rule 804 contains five more exceptions (so we’re up to thirty).  These 
include former testimony, dying declarations (“statement[s] under the belief 
of imminent death”),13 and statements “against interest,”14 that is, a 
 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 801. 
 10. Id. 801(d)(1). 
 11. Id. 801(d)(2). 
 12. See Christopher G. Miller, Implied Assertions in Evidence Law:  A Retrospective, 33 
MISS. COLL. L. REV. 1, 3–6 (2014). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
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statement that actually is harmful to the person making it; the theory is that 
he would be unlikely to make a false statement that harmed him—to say, 
for example, “I must have been drunk when my car hit the lamp post,” if 
one doesn’t drink. 
The last rule I want to mention (which happens also to be the final 
subrule of the federal hearsay rule) is Rule 807, entitled “residual 
exception,” a catchall provision that allows the admission of hearsay 
evidence if 
(1)  the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness [equivalent, that is, to hearsay statements permitted by 
other hearsay exceptions to be admitted in evidence]; (2)  it is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (3)  it is more probative on the point for which 
it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts; and (4)  admitting it will best serve the purposes of 
these rules and the interests of justice.15 
There are thus a total of thirty-one exceptions to the exclusion of hearsay 
evidence.  The first thirty are quite specific, and there is value to such a list 
of exceptions—otherwise a judge would in each case have to decide 
whether proffered hearsay evidence satisfied the balancing test in Rule 403.  
The problem comes with Rule 807, quoted above.  It is essentially open-
ended and, stripped of what amounts to ornamental verbiage, allows the 
admission of hearsay evidence whenever it is reliable and important to the 
case.  So the federal hearsay rule taken as a whole amounts to declaring that 
reliable hearsay evidence is admissible when necessary to a full 
adjudication of a case, and in addition thirty specific forms of hearsay 
evidence are routinely admissible.  The bar to hearsay evidence is thus full 
of holes.  In practice, maybe the bar is limited to unreliable or superfluous 
hearsay evidence.  And maybe that’s the best we can do. 
Those thirty exceptions seem to me on the whole sound, but with three 
exceptions.16  One of them, found in Rule 803(1) and captioned “present 
sense impression,” allows into evidence a “statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the 
declarant perceived it.”17  The stated rationale is that if the event described 
and the statement describing it are near each other in time, this “negate[s] 
the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation,” as the 
Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule state.18  I don’t get it—especially 
when “immediacy” is interpreted to encompass periods as long as twenty-
three minutes,19 sixteen minutes,20 and ten minutes.21  Even genuine 
immediacy is not a guarantor of truthfulness.  For it’s false that people can’t 
 
 14. Id. 804(b)(3). 
 15. Id. 807. 
 16. My discussion of the first two is based on my concurring opinion in United States v. 
Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799–802 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 17. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 18. Id. advisory committee’s note. 
 19. United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785–86 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 20. United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 21. State v. Odom, 341 S.E.2d 332, 335–36 (N.C. 1986). 
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make up a lie in a short period of time.  Most lies in fact are spontaneous.22  
So we read that “[a]s with previous research, we found that planned lies 
were rarer than spontaneous lies.”23  Suppose I run into an acquaintance on 
the street and he has a new dog with him—a little yappy thing—and he asks 
me, “Isn’t he beautiful?”  I answer “yes,” though I’m a cat person and 
consider his dog hideous. 
The “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule never had 
any grounding in psychology.  It entered American law in the nineteenth 
century,24 long before there was a field of cognitive psychology.  It has 
neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis; it’s not even common sense.  As 
remarked in Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,25 “As with much of the folk psychology of 
evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale [that immediacy negates the 
likelihood of fabrication] entirely seriously, since people are entirely 
capable of spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances”26—I would add 
that “[o]ld and new studies agree that less than one second is required to 
fabricate a lie.”27  Wigmore made the point 111 years ago:  “To admit 
hearsay testimony simply because it was uttered at the time something else 
was going on is to introduce an arbitrary and unreasoned test, and to 
remove all limits of principle . . . .”28 
The second exception to the hearsay rule that I question—the “excited 
utterance” exception of Rule 803(2)—allows into evidence “[a] statement 
relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement that it caused.”29  The Advisory Committee 
Notes provide an even less convincing justification for this exception than 
for the exception for present sense impressions.  The proffered justification 
is “simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which 
temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of 
conscious fabrication.”30  The two words I’ve emphasized (“may” and 
“conscious”) drain the attempted justification of any content.  And even if a 
person is so excited by something that he loses the capacity for reflection 
(which doubtless does happen), how can there be any confidence that his 
unreflective utterance, provoked by excitement, is reliable?  “One need not 
 
 22. See, e.g., Monica T. Whitty et al., Not All Lies Are Spontaneous:  An Examination of 
Deception Across Different Modes of Communication, 63 J. AM. SOC’Y OF INFO. SCI. & 
TECH. 208, 208–09, 214 (2012). 
 23. Id. at 214. 
 24. See Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against 
Hearsay:  Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 871–73 (1981). 
 25. 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 26. Id. at 588. 
 27. Id. (quoting Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the 
Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 916 (2001)); see also Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, 
and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 362–66 
(2012); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay:  A Criticism of Present 
Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 27–29. 
 28. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW §§ 1757, 2268 (1904). 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 30. Id. advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
2016] ON HEARSAY 1471 
be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under emotional stress; 
everybody accepts such statements with mental reservation.”31 
As pointed out in the McCormick treatise, 
The entire basis for the [excited utterance] exception may . . . be 
questioned.  While psychologists would probably concede that excitement 
minimizes the [possibility of] reflective self interest influencing the 
declarant’s statements, they have questioned whether this might be 
outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the 
declarant’s observation and judgment.32 
The Advisory Committee Notes acknowledge that the exception has been 
criticized, but defend it on the ground that “it finds support in cases without 
number.”33  That is less than reassuring.  Like the exception for present 
sense impressions, the exception for excited utterances rests on no firmer 
ground than judicial habit, in turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and 
reluctance to reconsider ancient dogmas. 
And finally, the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, an 
exception of medieval origin based on the Latin expression nemo moriturus 
praesumitur mentiri—“no one about to die is presumed to be lying,” as he 
would be jeopardizing his soul.  Many people nowadays do not believe that 
they have souls, or, if they do believe that, they’re dubious that a dying 
declaration will critically affect their afterlife destiny.  Moreover, 
Physical or mental weakness consequent upon the approach of death, a 
desire of self-vindication, or a disposition to impute the responsibility for 
a wrong to another, as well as the fact that the declarations are made in 
the absence of the accused, and often in response to leading questions and 
direct suggestions, and with no opportunity for cross-examination:  all 
these considerations conspire to render such declarations a dangerous kind 
of evidence.34 
Indeed so.  The hearsay exception for dying declarations, as for present 
sense impressions and excited utterances, is a fossil. 
To summarize briefly:  the hearsay rule is imperfect, but probably should 
be retained; the open-ended hearsay exception in Rule 807 should probably 
be tightened up; some of the hearsay exceptions should be abolished.  
Beyond these modest suggestions I am not yet prepared to go. 
 
 31. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of 
Evidence:  Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 437 (1928). 
 32. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 272, 366 (7th ed. 2013).  For a thorough up-to-date 
analysis and criticism of the excited utterance exception, see Alan G. Williams, Abolishing 
the Excited Utterance Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717 
(2015). 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 34. Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words:  Dying Declarations and Modern Confrontation 
Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1425 (quoting State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299, 
303 (1877)).  As Bellin remarks, “[T]he dying declaration exception . . . is:  (1) based on 
untested spiritual assumptions and (2) presumes a counterintuitive measure of lucidity on the 
part of the dying that science does not support.” See Bellin, supra note 8, at 1331. 
